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BOOK REVIEW

THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT.

By George

J. Alexander and Travis H. D. Lewin. Syracuse University, 1972.
Pp. 183. Paper.
This book explores the hypothesis that surrogate management
of the property of aged alleged incompetents is conducted in the
specific interest of some person other than the incompetent.' The
thesis is explored in the light of nationwide legislation that uniformly
2
purports to treat the incompetent's interest as paramount: Although
the focus is on the problems of the aged, many of the specific problems and certainly the philosophic objections raised in this book
apply equally to others accused of "mental illnesses" 3 and subject
to state intervention in management of their property.
The authors' research findings support their hypothesis by reonly
vealing that the interests of the incompetent are protected, with
4
They
design.
by
not
and
minor exceptions, only out of inadvertence
reach the
rather startling conclusion about the whole process of incompetency . . . drawn from the realization that in almost every
case examined the aged incompetent was in a worse position
after he was adjudicated incompetent than before. The study
could identify no particular benefit which flowed to the incompetent that he5 could not have received without a finding
of incompetency.
At the core of the authors' efforts to resolve the paradox between
the apparent concern of the legislators for the incompetent and the
practical utilization of the system for the interests of many others,
not including the incompetent is their recognition that legally imposed surrogate management constitutes a basic deprivation of the6
important right in a free society to individual self-determination.
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Consequently, it seems more appropriate to view the question
of how the laws should intervene not as a question of maximizing benefit to the potential ward but of reducing to a minimum the deprivation of that person's rights. From this perinterest is a surrogate
spective, one might better ask in whose
7
manager of property appointed?
For the aged, especially, it is difficult to accept the premise
that the property is being preserved for the ward's later use, since
the conditions of the aged are typified by gradual deterioration
rendering the likelihood of reversion of management to the aged
ward remote. Moreover, even though the ward's actual wealth may
increase, without "the power to spend his money to maximize his
own enjoyment, the ward's affluency would hardly seem likely to
be perceived by him as a benefit." s
The research findings and the authors' conclusions and suggestions are presented with a feeble attempt at restrained objectivity
that only thinly masks the tragedy of the story contained between
the lines of cold legalistic analysis. 9 The solutions suggested to the
problem of the wide gap between theory and practice are set out
in random form as the problems are discussed and ultimately
codified in a suggested "Model Estate Advisors and Managers Act."
Discussion of the Act is deferred in this review until the research
and some of the key problem areas are surveyed.
The research done to substantiate the act and the authors'
basic hypothesis-that the surrogate management of property
of the aged incompetent is conducted in the specific interest of
some person other than the incompetent-was completed 'in three
distinct phases: a comprehensive survey of existing state statutes;
a field study to investigate both the kind of information provided
in support of or opposed to incompetency (including alleged medical
and financial bases for the determination) and to evaluate the estate
management and the treatment of the incompetent; and, finally,
another "empirical study" consisting of interviews of trust officers,
judges, lawyers, medical and institutional personnel, government
10
officials, and hospitalized incompetent patients.
The authors first survey the nature of the process used to determine incompetency to manage property. Three kinds of criteria
for finding of incompetency are discussed: the "legal" (statutory)
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3.
9. A clue to the philosophic perspective of at least one of the authors, Dean Alexarwder, may be found in his prior co-authorship with Dr. Thomas SzasZ, long the bete
noire of institutional psychiatry, of an article entitled Mental Illness as a Excuse'for
CiV'tl Wrongs, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 24 (1968).
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definition; the "medical" definition, which is usually based on medical or psychiatric symptoms rather than on the affect they have
on the alleged incompetent's ability to manage property; and the
"practical" definition, a general category covering definitions by
participants in the process to suit their own purpose regardless
of the legal or medical considerations. 1 The study revealed the
primacy of the "medical" and "practical" definitions as determinants in the adjudication of competency over the legal considerations. When the "practical" consideration was not paramount, the
medical definition was used with the result:
that labelling replaced analysis and that the real decision
maker, albeit by default, was the examining physician. The
courts were usually left with little information beyond the
medical and/or psychiatric conclusions of the physician and
usually adjudicated incompetency consistent with the expressed findings of mental illness. Seldom was any attempt made
to inquire into the actual manner
in which the disease affect2
economic value judgment.1
The study showed that the doctors' generalities were based on more
or less detached descriptions of the patient's medical symptoms.
But "[n]ot one transcript examined nor medical report studied
revealed any attempt by the physician to detail the manner in which
the patient's capacity to manage his estate had been affected by
the underlying conclusion.'"
In contrast, in proceedings for restoration to competency, New
York courts required specific allegations with adequate proof, perhaps, as the authors suggest, because they labored under the impression that the decision to restore to competency in some way might
endanger the public. The contrast leads to a conclusion that:
It would seem that if we require more than a physician's
conclusions that a patient is competent before restoring him
to competency, we would hardly accept less detailed testimony if we intend to strip him of some basic civil liberties
and in the process stigmatize him as an incompetent. That
we do not is attributable to the layman's fear of mentally
ill persons, his ignorance of mental illness and the resultant
14
abrogation of decision-making duty to the psychiatrist.
The study also revealed that the guardian ad litem representing
an alleged incompetent seldom cross-examined the doctor and that
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the doctor's testimony nearly always resulted in a determination
of incompetency. Moreover, cross-examination, if conducted at all,
consisted only of questions concerning chronicity or projected length
of the alleged mental disability where the petitioner's attorney had
failed to inquire in that regard on direct examination. 5 Many
people are declared incompetent at hearings attended by neither
the potential ward nor the court appointed guardian ad litem; a
procedure in which obviously the ward's interest is protected, if at
16
all, only by the basic integrity of the system.
Based on the experience of the Veterans Administration17 the
authors conclude that the chronically mentally ill can in fact manage
their own property and that such management may itself prove
to be of therapeutic value and aid in the recovery of competency.
They suggest, therefore, that the medical standard is not the correct test, but rather that the courts should make a factual determination of the person's ability to handle his estate to be consistent
with the "legal" test.
For philosophically, if not statistically, significant numbers of
people in the New York system, even the medical test was ignored
in favor of the so-called "practical" test. For residents of the state
hospital studied, the authors discovered application of a test which
they formulate as follows:
Persons who have previously been admitted or committed
to a state hospital for the mentally ill will be deemed incompetent to manage their affairs provided: that they have assets in excess of the statutory limit; that the State is due
moneys for the care, treatment and maintenance of the patient; and that the patient continues to suffer from the underlying mental condition which effected his admission to the
hospital in the first instance."s
In other words, despite formal recognition of the accepted position that an incompetent does not necessarily need hospitalization
and its corollary that the hospitalized patient does not necessarily
need someone else to manage his business affairs, the state hospital
studied initiated an incompetency proceeding in every case where
the patient had property and where the hospital was not being paid
regularly for the cost of his care. The patient is declared incompetent not because of inability to manage funds, but solely to obtain
15.
16.
17.
see id.
18.

Id. at 171, n. 70.
Id. at 25.
For a description of the operations of the veterans Administration in this axea
at 76-80.
Id. at 27.
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convenient access to his funds. 9 This conclusion is supported by the
failure of the hospital to utilize resource management as an integral
part of its treatment program or to make an effort to assist the
patient in such management.
Procedural aspects for determination of incompetency are described in two ways: detailed state-by-state charts provide a nationwide reference and comparison for the important provisions of each
state's statutes; and, a general textual discussion also points up
the variety of treatment given to issues such as the right to a jury
trial and the type of control that may and should be exercised by
the fiduciary.
The authors' general summary of the nationwide variety of procedures used for the surrogate management of the property of the
aged reveals that many states either provide specifically for commitment and property management of the aged and senile or have
statutes that have been construed to include the aged within general
competency statutes. 20 Two problems complicate the matter for
the aged. First, there is the difficult determination of ability or
inability to manage with people who are having their faculties gradually slipping away 21-described by one commentator as the "notquite-incompetent" incompetents. 22 Secondly, there is the unfortunate reality that the chances are very high that incompetency will
2
occur if one lives long enough. 3
As a workable solution to these problems, the authors comment
favorably on a procedure (similar to California's) which would allow
a judge to appoint a conservator "if satisfied by sufficient evidence
of the need therefore" and thus avoid a determination of incompetency with its nebulous standards. The elderly person thus avoids
the brand of "incompetent." They also note a suggestion for allowing
execution of an instrument similar to a will, which would also contain instructions for estate management, and which would not allow
the court to exercise discretion and appoint another conservator
against the wishes of the conservatee. 24 The latter suggestion is
partially adopted in the authors' Model Act through provision for
voluntary appointment of an advisor, the least restrictive form
of interference-actually just what the term implies, merely one to
furnish advice and not control-and probably the best solution for
the "not-quite-incompetent incompetent. ' 2 The suggestion for ap19. Id. at 27.
20. Id. at 29-30.
21. Id. at 60.
22. Id. quoting McAvinchey, The Not-Quite-Incompetent Incompetent, 95 TRUSTS
ESTATES 872, 873 (1956).
23. Id. at 60.
24. Id. at 60-61.
25. Id. at 144-146 (Article 20).
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pointment of a conservator upon mere satisfaction by the court of
the need therefor is apparently and, in my view appropriately,
omitted from the Model Act since a finding of incapacity, by a jury
26
if requested, is still necessary.
Other procedures discussed are those providing for notice (surprisingly, several states allow the court to dispense with notice to
the alleged incompetent); powers of the guardian or conservator;
duties of the guardian or conservator; and control exercised by the
court over the fiduciary.
Another important suggestion for procedural reform is the idea
of a screening procedure in the area of geriatric resource management. The suggestion developed on the New York response to an
abolished informal system of admission for the aged into New
York's Mental Hospitals, called the "pink sheet" or "pink slip"
procedure. 27 New York abolished the "pink slip" procedure and
instituted the use of a geriatric screening team for evaluation
of patients' condition, to determine both the need for admission and
to intervene for elderly persons needing an alternative to mental
hospital placement. The screening teams actively seek alternatives
to hospitalization. The authors suggest the need for a parallel screening team concept in the area of incompetency.
The suggestion is to adapt the evaluative procedures of
the geriatric screening team to making a determination
based on medical and psychiatric criteria as to how much
of the individual's control of his own property should be handled by a surrogate-manager. At that point in time when the
State seeks to bring its proceeding, the screening team could
examine the patient in the environment in which he lives and
ascertain the limits of his ability to handle the various 2transactions that he will actually be called upon to make.
Three types of competency proceedings observed in the field
study in New York are described: those initiated by the State
26. Id. at 150,-155 (Article 40).
27. Under the "pink slip procedure" the aged could be admitted to the hospital without a judicial hearing; transfer from a general hospital to a mental institution was accomplished merely by petition of a member of the patient's family or other designated
person with the certificate of one physician. "If no objection was made, the hospital
would execute the required form and the patient would be transferred. Needless to say,
many of the aged persons did not object because they were rot told and were not aware
of what was happening to them." Id. at 63.
Thus, until 1968, the authors argue, no real effort was made in New York to keep
the aged out of mental hospitals. This was detrimental to the hospitals since less space
is available for those who need psychiatric care. More tragically, it was detrimental to
lbhe hospitals since less space is available for those who need psychiatric care. More
tragically, it was detrimental to the aged since the custodian atmosphere of the mental
hospital and its concomitant lack of activity and stimulation increased the ageds' deterioration and led to their earlier death. Id.
28. Id. at 66. Surprisingly, the suggestion for a screening procedure is not reflected in
the authors' Model Act.
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of New York; proceedings initiated by individuals; and proceedings
instituted by the Veterans Administration. In proceedings initiated
by the State, the study leads to the unfortunate conclusion that
the incompetent's interest is not protected. The only protected interest is that of the State, which gains an expedient access to the estate
of the patient for recovery of the costs of care, treatment and
maintenance. That conclusion is bitterly ironic since it is also pointed
out that institutionalization in a mental hospital has serious mental
and physical consequences for the aged. The almost automatic
procedure employed by the State against a hospital patient with an
estate leads to serious questions of constitutionality regarding deprivation of property rights without due process of law and through
deprivation of a valuable program of therapy which could result
from allowing the patient some degree of continued control and
management of his property rather than presenting the all or nothing
choice between a committee (guardianship) or neglect. 29
With regard to proceedings initiated by individuals, a clear-cut
assessment is not so easy because of the variety of individuals
initiating the proceedings and the corresponding variety of motives.
The authors summarize that:
actions commenced by private persons were frequently inaugurated to protect some specific or general interest of the
petitioner. While there was no indication that the intent or
the result was to defraud the mentally disabled, in numerous
cases the adjudication of incompetency made it easier for the
petitioner to accomplish certain purposes not necessarily in
the interest of the incompetent. ...
There was no fraud-simply a case of not promoting the
proper interest or of 'using incompetency as a convenient
substitute for civil creditor remedies."
The proceedings initiated by the Veterans Administration were
in marked contrast. The veterans as a group generally resided at
home and did not incur large hospitalization expenses, or received
whatever hospitalization and medical attention as needed free of
charge at a government hospital. Moreover, the VA administered
estates primarily for young veterans. Thus, the federal government
is able to encourage its charges to handle as much of their property as possible, and does not need to institute proceedings to gain
access to their funds for reimbursement. Because of the relative
youth of the veterans, the procedures are premised on the assumption that the veterans will have their property returned to them.
29.
80.

Id. at 67-71.
Id. at 76.
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Although the authors admit the VA performs no miracles, the VA
experience is offered as demonstration that it is possible to assist
the mentally disabled if estate management goals are constructed
in accordance with the long-term needs of the ward and if the individual's management of his own funds is encouraged rather than
forbidden.3 1
The powers and duties of surrogate managers are also extensively described. A brief textual description of the variety of state
provisions is provided together with a state-by-state chart listing
the applicable statutes; whether they provide for power over the
person, over the property, or both; and other significant provisions.
In addition to the chart and general descriptions of guardianship,3 2
conservatorship, 33 the committee or curator system,3 4 and "mixed
surrogate management provisions, 35 a more detailed statutory comparison between the California and New York systems is also provided.36
More interesting, however, than the tedious taxonomy of systems,
is the section on the New York model in practice. Most states
probably provide minimally adequate statutory provisions, as does
New York. The authors agree that reading the New York statutes
indicates a host of friends to protect the incompetent's interests.
The statutes provide for active representation of the alleged incompetent by a guardian ad litem who must be a licensed attorney
and who is directed to appear and represent and protect the client's
interests with diligence. As the authors state, "[flew other litigations in our civil courts have such seeming advantages." 7
"Seeming"-that is the rub. The survey of practice showed
that the guardian ad litem, despite his important place in the statutory theory, actually played an insignificant role, being used merely
to facilitate the determination of incompetency.
He views himself not as an advocate championing the cause
of his client 'accused' of incompetency, whose activities will
be analyzed by a trial judge but rather he plays the role of
an impartial agent of the court who is inserted into the process as a sort of referee to insure that the alleged incompetent's rights are fully protected.3
This failure to assume the traditional role of an advocate has sev31.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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eral serious consequences.
The finding of incompetency was invariably assured when
the guardian ad litem after his consultation with the petitioner's attorney, the petitioner, the ward and less frequently
the examining physician (or after reading his report) decided
the proceeding was proper. As a result, the incompetency
hearing is eroded into a pro forma rubber stamp approval
of the petitioner's claim and the guardian's verification of
incompetency. As a practical matter with the incompetent's
"day in court" ends with the visit by his guardian, because,
thereafter as a result of the guardian's agreement with the
petitioner, the hearing is a mere formality. Certainly, the
petitioner's burden of proving incompetency is considerably
reduced. He no longer has to come forward with the kinds
of proof that one would ordinarily require if the subject
about to be stripped of his most precious civil liberties were
represented by an adversary-oriented counsel.3 9
In addition to the attorney's "friend of the court" posture aiding
the petitioner and his attorney in achieving their goal, and more
disturbing, it is also reported that it was not unusual for the guardian
actively to participate in keeping knowledge of the forthcoming
proceeding from the potential incompetent. A candid assessment of
the proceeding recognizes that:
Since the guardian can waive the right to trial by jury
and since he took no active part in contesting incompetency,
the finding of incompetency even with a jury, for all practical
purposes, was the product of a deceptive interview conducted
by the person singularly
charged with protecting the incomo
petent's interests.
The meagerness of the fees of the attorney (guardian ad litem)
are also seen as reflecting the neutrality of their position; the fees
of the alleged incompetent's lawyer were substantially below those
of the lawyer for the petitioner. Although thus viewed as ironically
reflecting their value to the proceedings, the study revealed no
indication of fraud. The failure of the guardian ad litem to act as
an advocate is instead a result of the guardian's misconception of
41
the role he should play.

This small segment of the study is quite important, for it has
ramifications throughout our various statutory systems of enforced
benevolence. 42 As the authors' note, for example, the attorney's
39. Id. at 107-108.
40. Id. at 108.
41. Id. at 109.
42.
See generally N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT
therapeutic state and the implications for law and lawyers.

(1971)

on the rise of the
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complicity in failure to furnish the client notice of the impending
legal obliteration of his right to control his property may be a result
of a practical surrender by lawyers to the medical profession's
view of commitment as a necessary step toward therapy in the
process of restoring the subject to "health." This is so despite
their training to view serious deprivations of property or liberty
without notice as a fundamental violation of due process. But to the
medical profession, " 'notice' can only confuse and agitate the patient, perhaps to the extent of actually interfering in the treatment
process in that it makes the patient believe he is being 'accused'
of mental illness with the result that he fights the incarceration and
'43
the treatment offered.
This same confusion of roles has apparently spilled over into
the lawyer's actions as guardian ad litem for incompetency proceedings, despite the apparent directions otherwise provided by the
legislative scheme. The whole affair recalls Justice Brandeis's warning that "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard
to protect liberty where the government's purposes are benevo44
lent."
Improvement in the attorney's conception of his proper role in
the proceeding will in part depend on the commitment of the bar
and of legal education to encourage the type of research embodied
in this book. A lifetime of study of the "laws on the books" relating
to incompetency would never reveal the perversion of the theory
of benevolence portrayed in the cases collected and studied by
the authors.
The analysis of New York practice concludes with discovery
of "the appalling failure by administrators of the incompetents'
estates to comply with the clear requirements of the laws relating
to estate management. ' 45 Lawyers here fare poorly also. Their
theoretical familiarity with complicated laws and procedures did
not prevent their keeping right in, step with other administrators
in failure to comply with the reporting and accounting provisions
of the statutes. The lack of compliance is explained by the authors
by two factors: "the lawyer's natural propensity for procastination;
and the procedure practiced in the county studied being inadequately
designed to insure compliance with the laws." 46 It would be unseemly
for me to comment on the former without more adequate personal
experience or research. My hope, if not my suspicion, as to the
43. G. ATEXANDER AND T. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE
MENT 108 (1972).
44. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
45.
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latter, is that the procedures elsewhere are more adequate. To the
extent that courts may be less overloaded with work in North Dakota
that hope may be justified by an expectation that personal judicial
attention to compliance with the accounting provisions is the rule
rather than the exception. Hopefully research in North Dakota would
not lead to the same conclusion as the New York study: that the
system
fairly insures that deception will go unnoticed. In such a system, if fraud is in fact not practiced, it is certainly not because of the legal process involved. It must be solely because
of the personal integrity of the many persons who
control
4 7
or exert an influence on the incompetent's estate.
A comparison of the roles of different types of committees 8
also turned up some interesting conclusions. Although lawyers were
appointed committee of the person and property in 21.4% of the
cases studied, no category of cases was identified
wherein the appointment of the lawyer as committee was
peculiarly in the best interests of the incompetent. This leads
to the conclusion that nothing is gained by the incompetent
having a lawyer appointed as his committee which could
not
49
be achieved without a declaration of incompetency.
Banks as committees are potentially more beneficial for three.
reasons: with pooled trust funds, small estates could benefit from
the bank's professional trust experience; second, because banks
do not have to furnish bond, the fee saving is sometimes significant;
third, fees charged by banks as committees were generally lower.
Banks, however, are not necessarily ideal committees. They tend
to be impersonal and their management, which takes into account
no relationship between the property managed and the owner's
mental, physical, and emotional needs, is narrow in scope. Also,
since they are unable to effectively and profitably manage real
estate they attempt to divest the ward's ownership of it at the
earliest opportunity.50
If attorneys and banks are inadequate, private individuals remain to be considered. Since such individuals are most often relatives
of the ward, it could at least be assumed that they would take a
more personal and solicitous interest in the needs and wishes of
the incompetent. Relative committees, however, seemed to visit
47.
48.
called
49.
50.

Id. at 114.
New York has a "committee" system for surrogate management. The manager Is
a "committee" even though the position is filled by one person. Id. at 92-94.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 117-120.
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their incompetent wards no more frequently than they would have
without their committee status, and regrettably, there was evidence
that appointment of a relative did not even assure closer personal
attention. Even more lamentable, the most serious abuses in the
process were found with management by private persons.5 1
The study also deals briefly with restoration to competency.
The subject is easily summarized: restoration is difficult and infrequent in comparison with the initial determination of incompetency;
restoration for the aged incompetent, especially if also a patient
in the state hospital, is nearly impossible and seldom occurs. Medical definitions are again substituted for legal criteria and restora52
tion of competency to manage property is Irargely ignored.
Again, the experience of the Veterans Administration is pointed
to by the authors as pointing the way toward resolution of the problem. In contrast to the state system observed (New York), the
Veterans Administration has a policy of actively encouraging and
aiding the ward in a program designed to help him to manage
his own funds. The distinct difference in emphasis is on financial
rather than medical considerations. 3 The authors conclude that:
The lack of restorations among the elderly incompetents
may be due in part to the treatment goals employed in the
geriatric wards. The state hospitals are oriented towards
custodian management of the geriatric patient rather than
towards active therapeutic involvement leading towards recovery or discharge. They are kept as comfortable as is possible until death. By contrast, the majority of younger patients, particularly those fortunate enough to be under private
care or in VA hospitals, who are restored are put through
the normal treatment and therapeutic process with an orientation towards cure rather than merely management. This
would seem to be the necessary element lacking in geriatric
restorations. As long as restoration to competency is deemed
the equivalent of eligibility for discharge or it is a forgotten
or impractical legal and treatment goal, we can expect that
incompetency is a permanent condition for the debilitated
aged.54
The study is capped by a summary and conclusion. Readers who
do not wish to plow through the often tedious and repetitive research
findings, which are presented largely as a cut-and-paste conglomeration of the authors' successive stages of research, may well want
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to read this short concluding chapter and then confine themselves
to study of the model act.
The importance of the book lies primarily in the potential for
improvement of the system contained in the authors' novel suggestions for closing the gap between theory and practice in the law
of surrogate management. The solution is suggested to lie in recognition of two basic factors presently glossed over by the extant
legislation.
First, legislators must recognize a presumption that persons
who need surrogate managers will many times obtain them of their
own accord. The authors report that their empirical data provides
no reason for assuming that the aged, although to some extent
mentally debilitated, as a class are more indifferent to proper
management of the property than the general population. 55
Secondly, the authors object to the breadth of intervention allowed under the surrogate management relationship. The all or
nothing nature of the process leads to overkill, by taking away
all decision making authority. The authors suggest that when the
problem is mere memory loss or unfamiliarity with the legal process, rather than a loss of judgment concerning personal goals, a
middle road should be established. Thus, they suggest a system
that provides for degrees of disability, as a compromise to abolition
of incompetency followed by total neglect.
The umbrella of protection that the incompetency procedure provides is readily opened at the first outpouring of
mental debility, but it appears to protect only those who can
open it and not those upon whom misfortune falls. The only
practical solution is the abolition of the concept of incompetency. However, it is important to point out that this repudiation is not really a radical step because the concept has
already been abandoned in practice. This analysis has resulted from the following observations made by the field
study. First, the statutory provisions and procedures in New
York not only do not accomplish what is sought to be done,
but also do far more harm than the statistical data this study
has reported can reflect, a harm that can only begin to be
understood by a visit to a geriatrics ward anywhere. Nevertheless, this study can factually support its conclusion that
all the inadequacies, inequities and outright oppressiveness of
the laws and practices in this area are magnified and intensified when an aged person is involved. The aged are the most
likely to be declared incompetent and by far the least likely
to ever be left alone. But, of course, there must be some
equitable middleground between neglect and imprisonment.
55.

Id. at 3.
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This second observation is the reason why we propose that
a new statute be enacted. 58
The suggested solution to the problem of incompetency, particularly for the aged, is two-fold. The authors state that half the
problem lies in the medical profession's and institutional psychiatry's use of mental hospitals as repositories for the aged. A note
of hopeful recognition of this problem by the medical profession
is sounded, but resolution of the problem is recognized as beyond
the scope of the book. Hopefully continued research will be undertaken, however, to avoid this depository syndrome which one may
guess is not confined to New York. It does not take much experience,
or imagination, to speculate as to the percentage of residents in
North Dakota's State Hospital for the Mentally Ill at Jamestown
who would not be there if adequate alternative facilities such as
nursing homes, without the stigma of mental illness, were provided.
The more legalistic suggestion lies in the authors' proposed
Model Act for Estate Advisors and Managers. The chief feature
of the Act is its differentiation between several degrees of disability,
which avoids the all-or-nothing dichotomy in the present law between
full power to manage or no power. Three categories are recognized:
moderate "impairment" (Section 10.00 [6]), serious "disability"
(Section 10.00 [7]), and total "incapacity" (Section 10.00 [8]).
The options provided are described as follows:
The surrogate power to regulate property is designed to be
applied only in accordance with actual need. Thus, the least
seriously afflicted person may have an impairment, but the
assistance available to him will not interfere with his freedom
to manage his estate in any manner he sees fit. To give
him some assistance, the model act permits the appointment
(or gives sanction to his own voluntary request for assistance)
of an "advisor." Note that the advisor cannot interfere with
the advisee's financial conduct. He is there only to advise.
The thesis is that some persons, particularly the aged, because of senility or other predominantly physical problems
other less elderly people. Their forgetfulness, their anxieties
and other problems may place them in a position where
unscrupulous people can readily take advantage of them.
These people need someone to turn to quickly without embarrassment. That is the function of the advisor. He acts
although he is not authorized to make legal decisions, as
there is no requirement that
the advisor be an attorney li57
censed to practice the law.
For the more seriously impaired, but not totally disabled, the
56.
57.

Id. at 137.
Id. at 141.
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act provides for a middle ground by creating the position of "property manager." (Article 30) The property manager initially acts
essentially the same as an advisor and only after observation of
the need for greater control may the property manager then, upon
direction of the court, assume limited management responsibilities
designed only for preserving capital and avoiding waste of income,
while reserving to the disabled person the right to handle his
income for necessities. 58 For those with total incapacity, the act
provides for appointment of a "conservator." (Article 40)
A novel and important feature of the act is its incorporation
of the principle of the least restrictive alternative.5 9 A preference
is built into the act at each stage for using the advisor, if possible;
if not, the property manager; and only as a last result, appointing
a conservator. Imposition of each more restrictive form of control
must be justified by the court by findings of fact and conclusions
of law that a less restrictive form is inappropriate.
Many other interesting features are built into the act to avoid
the evils noted in the study and described in this review. What
makes consideration of the model act especially important for North
Dakota lawyers and legislators now is that the guardianship provisions presently contained in the North Dakota Statutes have recently been replaced by Article V of the Uniform Probate Code enacted
by the 43rd Legislative Assembly with an effective date of July 1,
1975. The Uniform Probate Code has received widespread publicity
and has been the subject of extensive legal comment.60 One of
the reasons for the delayed effective date was to allow the public,
and especially the bar, to consider its provisions for possible modification at the next session of the legislature. Numerous articles
have been written about the provisions of the Code dealing with
lawyers' bread and butter-wills, trusts, and decedents' estates.
However, guardianship provisions have generally been overlooked.
If North Dakota suffers to any significant extent from any of the
problems noted in the New York study, a long hard look at the
guardianship and conservatorship provisions of the new code should
be mandatory.
A detailed comparison of the Uniform Probate Code's Article V
and the Model Estate Advisors and Managers Act is beyond the
58. Id. at 142.
59. For a masterful treatment of this doctrine and its development in the related
context of civil commitment, see Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MicI. L. REV. 1107
(1972).
60. Local examples are Stroup, Probate Practice Under the Uniform Probate Code,
46 N.D.L. REv. 289 (1970); Davis, The New North Dakota Probate Code, 49 N.D.L.
REV. 563 (1973); and Note, the Uniform Probate Code--A Pefreshing Approach to Probate Reform, 46 N.D.L. REV. 327 (1970).
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scope of this review but will hopefully be undertaken prior to the
next legislative session. A few general points, however, should be
made. Article V of the Uniform Probate code manifests special
concern for minors but not for the aged."' The main positive feature
of the Code is its provision (Section 5-510) allowing execution
of a power of attorney which may become or remain effective following a subsequent disability. The rest of Article V seems designed
to facilitate, rather than to prevent or to make difficult, most of
the evils outlined in the New York study. The informality allowed
by the Code seems designed to grant greater power to the manager
with fewer controls or safeguards.
Returning to the book, however, the surprising thing is the
authors' complete lack of concern for the Uniform Probate Code.
In light of the widespread fanfare for the Code, the only conclusion
I can draw is that the legislative survey contained in the book was
not reworked for some time prior to the 1972 publication date. As a
result, the book loses much of its potential effectiveness as a
spur to legislative reform, since the "hot property" now is the
Uniform Probate Code.
This is not an easy book to read. If it were not for the current
importance of the subject matter, purchase of the book could hardly
be recommended. The original study, Surrogate Management of the
Property of the Aged, 62 was very adequate and certainly much
clearer than the present work. A good additional article, based
on the empirical study, would have been adequate, perhaps combined
with a student comment on the Model Act and an update of the
statutory survey.6 3 As it is, one has to believe that more time
could have been devoted to the melding effort that produced the
book. If nothing else, it could have been made much easier to
read.
These critical comments, I should emphasize, are not intended
to dissuade anyone from purchase and study of the book. My concern is that the proposed statute and its supporting research, presented in this form, will not provide the desired commitment to
seek alternative methods of statutory reform. After all, a good collection of ideas can serve a much more useful function if it is not
only comprehensive, which this book is, but also readable, which
61.

See, e.g.,

Section 5-103,

the facility of payment clause which allows up to $5,000

per year to be paid to a married minor or to the custodian of an unmarried minor or
deposited for the minor in a federally insured financial institution, without the necessity
for formal appointment or supervision through protective proceedings.
62. Alexander, Surrogate Management of the Property of the Aged, 21 SYRAcusE L.
Rgv. 87 (1969).
63. A student note, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship: Have the
Elderly Freedom to Spend?, 73 YALE L. J. 676 (1964), previewed many of the problems
and suggestions contained in this volume.
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it is nearly not. Some of the style or lack of it that bogs the reader
down may be attributed to the subject matter and the method of
the study project, perhaps-but not all of it. Only the most interested
reader will persevere as far as the model act. The organization is
confusing and the style is a cross between Corpus Juris Secundum
and a humanized American Jurisprudence Second. In addition to
the poor organization and style, the book is rife with spelling and
grammatical errors and garbled syntax. Although most of the errors
are in themselves trivial, criticism of their oversight is not is not picayune, since they tend to greatly reduce the reader's speed, efficiency,
and inclination to continue.
In summary, then, this book presents a very important and
well-developed study of the abuses of surrogate management of
the property of the aged. It is especially important that the study
and its culmination embodied in the Model Act for Estate Advisors
and Managers be considered by the bar and legislators in North
Dakota, since a major change in the guardianship provisions of
North Dakota, Article V of the Uniform Probate Code, has been
effected almost without notice. The authors' suggestions, especially
those concerning the degrees of disability and provision for voluntary use of an advisory system, deserve our serious consideration.
The product is valuable but the shoddy packaging may deter the
most important potential consumers.

